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The “Design Event”: The Anti-Design-Historian and a Poetics of the 
Object. 
Kerry William Purcell 
 
Abstract 
What happens when a sudden encounter with a design-object calls into question 
traditional approaches to the history of design? Or, alternatively, when such moments 
make manifest how the symbolic roles we occupy as design historians can serve to 
obstruct our singular relationship to the object? Beginning with what is cautiously 
termed the “design event”, this article seeks to explore how an examination of how 
our own unconscious fascinations and obsessions that encircle the material object, can 
offer the potential for a self-reflective approach to design history, one that locates the 
reasons for our passionate preoccupations at the very heart of our analysis. 
Furthermore, it is argued that a focus on what is singular to the self, on the 
intersubjective relationships that have shaped our attachments to certain objects, can 
serve to form part of a broader challenge to the carefully constructed symbolic 
identities we are interpellated by in our professional roles as historians.  
 
 
 
It seems to me then as if all the moments of our life occupy the same space,  
as if future events already existed and were only waiting for us to find our way  
to them at last, just as when we have accepted an invitation we duly arrive in a  
certain house at a given time.  
W.G. Sebald, Austerlitz, (2001: 359-360) 
	 2
 
In the summer of 2005, I was driving along the sea-front of a small town in Kent, 
South East England. I had just dropped my eldest daughter off at her mother’s house 
and was making the long journey home. Still smarting from an acrimonious and 
protracted divorce, it was always a tough drive back and I was emotionally quite raw. 
As I drove down the coastal road, I saw a small café that I had passed many times 
before and even been inside on a few occasions. However, this time, there was 
something uncanny about it. I pulled the car over and got out. I realized that what had 
caught my attention was the sign for the café, then known as “The Russet”. The 
typeface it was set in was familiar, but I wasn’t sure why. I remembered this incident, 
when, a few days later, I was walking in London, on my way to a meeting, and I saw 
it again, used on the street signs throughout the city (fig.1). It suddenly struck me: a 
modified version of this typeface – which I discovered was called Albertus, and had 
been designed in the 1930s by the German typographer and calligrapher Berthold 
Wolpe – was used in the 1960s TV program The Prisoner (fig. 2). 
 As a small child, this program held a special fascination for me. The 
Prisoner’s main protagonist is played by actor Patrick McGoohan, an ex-secret 
service agent who has been kidnapped and relocated to “the Village”. The village is 
presented as an isolated site from which no one can escape. It is entirely populated by 
ex-secret service employees, who, because of their sensitive knowledge, are kept as 
prisoners by their own government. They are known by numbers instead of names: 
the main protagonist (McGoohan) is No.6. Each episode sees him in quest to 
determine why he has been brought there, who is No.1 (a case of the ultimate 
unknowability of the Big Other), and how he can escape. However, even though they 
are prisoners, the façade of “normal” village life is seemingly sustained by the other 
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inmates through village fetes, sports events and even local elections (which all use the 
Albertus typeface as a kind of corporate identity). The village is a disturbing 
paranoiac environment, with obvious references to Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon and 
George Orwell’s 1984. Watching this as a 7-year-old child, I felt a deep connection to 
McGoohan’s plight (fig.3). Clearly, at the time, I was too young to understand its 
relevance to my life, but on seeing this typeface on the café sign in Kent and 
throughout London, it became clear. As the child of an immigrant mother, who was 
incredibly private and frequently distant, in a home where there were numerous 
taboos about which we could not speak, The Prisoner struck a chord. Home was an 
environment which you could not leave, where you had to act out a seemingly normal 
life, with normal activities, with an unknowable “leader”. Moreover, it was not a 
coincidence that, as many of the voiceless issues in my childhood home were 
consequences of fractured families and divorce, when I was taking my own daughter 
– who also, at the time, happened to be 7 years old – back to her mother’s house, this 
typeface and all its rich associations suddenly captured my attention. 
 Clearly, this example is something singular to myself. Yet, this article will 
explore, with reference to the work of Jacques Lacan (by way of interpretation by 
Slavoj Žižek) and Walter Benjamin, how often the designed objects that interest each 
of us actually function as unspoken registers of a lack in the symbolic space that 
constitutes our very being. How many unspoken traumas or absences that guide our 
readings of the designed object are masked by what Lacan referred to as a “university 
discourse” (Lacan, 2006)? Does the use of such a language blind the historian to the 
fact that they are studying nothing more than the particular constellations whose 
causality is formed by their subjective attachments (albeit attachments that are 
themselves formed in a matrix of socio-historical discourses)? Moving onto the 
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material object itself, as we will see, Benjamin’s concept of the “monad” is useful in 
this regard, in that it offers the recognition that in such condensed moments “all the 
forces and interests of history enter on a reduced scale” (Benjamin 1999: 475). The 
recognition of such monads is, for Benjamin, a political act of the utmost importance. 
It enables the historian to blast “a specific life out of the era or specific work out of 
the lifework” (Benjamin 1992: 254). In my argument, the design-object as monad is 
not only connected to a historical totality but also serves as a route to a condensed 
moment of psycho-social revelation through which our relationship to the past can be 
reordered. In the example above, the typeface Albertus served to mark a lack in my 
childhood. It marked the unknown site of the desires of my mother – desires that had 
been shaped by a coalescence of mass migration of the Irish to Britain in the mid-
twentieth century, alongside more personal experiences – that manifested itself in the 
seemingly (to a 7-year-old child) random institution of certain taboos. Through my 
realization that Albertus functioned as a monad of earlier experiences – which, 
following the work of French philosopher Alain Badiou, I am going to tentatively call 
a “design event”1 – I have been able to wrestle this design-object away from more 
traditional realm of design history, a critical language that frequently negates the 
idiosyncratic (and quite often irrational, aggressive, erotic, and hysteric) desires that 
encircle the material object.  
 
Mind the Gap 
What is clear from the above is that there is an unnamable dialectic. On the one hand, 
the object is clearly representative of a specific localized historical narrative, 
encapsulating the ambitions of its original author(s), and moreover, had (and 
continues to have) a social existence in its utilization. Yet, as we have seen, the object 
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also contains, in reference to the work of Benjamin, a messianic redemption as a 
monad of certain psycho-social relations, a monad that is ripe for retrospective 
change. In The Parallax View (2006), Slavoj Žižek offers a productive way to map 
out the tension present when we have two such related perspectives but from which 
there is no common ground to view them both. In Žižek’s words, this parallax gap is 
detectable within “the apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its position 
against a background), caused by a change in observational position that provides a 
new line of sight” (Žižek 2006: 17). A common example of this is the Rubin’s Vase, 
where there is a fluctuation in the figure-ground relationship; you are either looking at 
one or the other but not both at the same time. Applying Žižek’s approach to other 
areas, such as design history, we have the analysis of the social, economic, cultural 
and biographical determinants that shape and frame the designed object, but often at 
the expense of the more singular and idiosyncratic characteristics that form our 
relationship to the thing in itself, while a discourse characterized by personal and 
individual revelations and/or associations with a design is customarily (but not 
exclusively) enacted independent of those historical forces. In both scenarios, the 
analysis is about the same thing, but they cannot be reduced to a single vantage point, 
there is a gap. 
 The gap that arises in the shift in position is not reducible or open to being 
synthesized away in a traditional Hegelian Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis – that would 
be to occupy some position external to our perspective on the object, of which, as has 
been argued, we are a part (this would be the “view from nowhere” as the philosopher 
Thomas Nagel famously phrased it; or akin to picking yourself up by your own hair, 
or jumping on your own shadow). As Žižek notes “there is an irreducible a-symmetry 
between the two perspectives, we have a perspective and what eludes it, and the other 
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perspective fills in the void of what we could not see from the first perspective” 
(Žižek 2006: 29). This shift reveals what Žižek calls the “minimal difference”, which 
divides the object from itself. By attempting to reveal the subversive heart of 
dialectical materialism, Žižek directs our attention to the productive gap between 
opposites, rather than a traditional focus on the polarity of opposites or a desire to 
synthesize. 
 To further enable us to understand this minimal difference or gap in the object, 
Žižek speaks of “the frame” or “framing” as central to the analysis.  For Žižek, the 
“subject and object are inherently ‘mediated,’ so that an ‘epistemological’ shift in the 
subject’s point of view always reflects an ‘ontological’ shift in the object itself” 
(Žižek 2006: 17). This redoubling of the frame – a shift in the subject engenders a 
shift in the object – is evident in Freud’s well-known case of his little daughter 
fantasizing about eating a strawberry cake. As Žižek himself highlights,  
 
… what we have here is by no means a simple case of the direct 
hallucinatory satisfaction of a desire (she wanted a cake, she 
didn’t get it, so she fantasized about it…). That is to say: what 
one should introduce here is precisely the dimension of 
intersubjectivity: the crucial feature is that while she was 
voraciously eating a strawberry cake, the little girl noticed how 
her parents were deeply satisfied by this spectacle, by seeing her 
fully enjoying it – so what the fantasy of eating a strawberry cake 
is really about is her attempt to form an identity (of the one who 
fully enjoys eating a cake given by the parents) that would satisfy 
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her parents, would make her the object of their desire… (Žižek 
1997: 9) 
 
If we return to the vision of my 7-year-old self watching The Prisoner, I was not only 
enjoying/desiring the program but also adopting an identity of enjoyment to meet with 
the (unknowable) desire of my mother. As already discussed, how many times in our 
childhood have our relationships to design-objects been mediated by the desire of the 
other? To the point which, to quote Lacan, the object is “in the subject more than the 
subject itself” (Lacan, cited in Žižek 1997: 9-10). 
 
The Singularity of Being (An Historian) 
Yet, when moving from personal recollection to historical record and back again, 
there is always a danger of being marooned on one side of the crossing point. 
Élisabeth Roudinesco has outlined in relation to her own archival research on Lacan: 
“If everything is filed, monitored, noted or judged, history as creation is no longer 
possible: it is replaced by the archive transformed into absolute knowledge. But if 
nothing is filed, if everything is erased or destroyed, then there is nothing to stop 
narrative being swept off into fantasy, or the hallucinatory sovereignty of the ego, in 
favor of a kind of archive that functions as a dogma” (Roudinesco 2014: 51). Drift too 
far one way, and we come to occupy the imaginary position of the One, the symbolic 
authority, the singular gatekeeper of the historical record; too far in the opposite 
direction, and our individual investments give rise to historical narratives that are 
nothing more than a concoction of reverie and desire. Still, being attentive to why 
certain design-objects necessitate our attention in the present can serve to reveal 
fissures in the field, gaps that require us to ask how a particular design has been (and 
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continues to be) utilized, a challenge to the object as reified and frozen. “For every 
image of the past”, as Benjamin famously highlighted, “that is not recognized by the 
present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably” (Benjamin, 
1992: 247). Although directed at the ruling class’s proclivity to bypass those events 
that undermine its view of history as continual progress, this approach also lends itself 
to analysis of how the personal revelation, the design event, reveals the exclusion of 
intersubjective meanings that continue to inform our interpretation of design. To 
return to the beginning of this work, it recalls the scenario of a child who realizes (if 
only unconsciously) that their questions will never be answered, and therefore stops 
asking them (or learns to only ask certain kinds of questions). When we rely on names 
that are fixed, unchanging, as Roudinesco highlighted, history as process becomes 
dogmatic, permanent and unmoving; historical truth fails to shift, is neutered of its 
ability to transcend the boundaries of a dominant way of being or established set of 
conventions.  
When speaking about the often ephemeral objects of design history, Benjamin 
continues to have a special relevance here. Throughout his work we can detect a 
“theory of redemption [where] there is an effort to ‘rescue’ phenomena from their 
‘degraded, immediate state’ by recombining them in a dialectical image, for the 
purpose of extracting a ‘prehistory’ and, perhaps, a suppressed dream of utopia which 
the dead and reified artifacts are still capable of emitting” (Harootunian 1996: 79). 
Articulating the singular relationship we may have with a piece of design offers a way 
in which to bypass the dominant symbolic forms of historical record, a way of 
“rescuing” objects from a historical language that nullifies this alternative way of 
speaking. Being attentive to how our desires were formed towards a piece of design 
can aid us towards liberating the “suppressed dream”, can reveal how our obsessions 
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are mediated by intersubjective and socio-historic discourses that shaped our original 
encounter with the object, discourses that continue to determine how we view the 
object because of the hegemonic persistence of a form of political economy that 
shaped the initial confrontation. “In the dialectical image,” Benjamin said, “what has 
been within a particular epoch is always, simultaneously, ‘what has been from time 
immemorial.’ It is at this moment that the historian takes up, with regard to that 
image, the task of dream interpretation.” (1999: 943).  
 However, too often in design history, the way we encounter the designed 
object is not dissimilar to alienation from the object experienced by the worker under 
capitalism. In The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx noted that “the 
externalization [Entäusserung] of the worker in his product means that not only that 
his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, 
independently of him and alien to him, and begins to confront him as an autonomous 
power; that the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile and 
alien” (Marx [1844] 2002: 119). Could it not be argued that the design-object of our 
fascination, an object we have imbued with some psychic labor, is often experienced 
as something separate, experienced as unutterably Other, fetishized to the point in 
which we are alienated from why we are drawn to it and see it as distinctive? Is this 
itself simply a symptom, à la Benjamin, of how certain socio-political discourses that 
framed our original encounter with the object still underpin the historical moment in 
which we re-encounter it? Or, to turn to my example of Albertus, does the sudden 
revelation of why a piece of typography holds special significance in 2005 mirror a 
corresponding crisis in the underling socio-political discourse of 1978, an echo or 
association that in itself has precipitated this historical remembrance? It is beyond the 
limits of this essay to engage in such a study, but the argument being made here – 
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following Benjamin – is that the particularity of the subjective encounter could serve 
to mask a crisis in the totality. 
 The key here is the attempt to excavate the contingent subjective, social and 
political issues that weave themselves around the design object, while remaining 
forever alert to the incommensurability of them both. I question how this object as 
symptom of an earlier intersubjective experience of the Other’s desire – the idea of 
the design-object inhabiting some kind of painful lack in the other (i.e. the strawberry 
cake or a typeface), a wound or lack generated by socio-political discourses – equally 
problematizes a historical approach that negates the subjective element. Move too far 
to one side and there is a danger that design writing becomes increasingly reified, 
more “thing like”. Too far the other way and we experience something akin to what 
Borges attributed to the novelist William Henry Hudson, who apparently said that 
“throughout my life whenever I have undertook [sic] the study of metaphysics, 
happiness always interrupts me” (Borges, cited in Bosteels 2008: 175). The intensity 
of the existential experience of the object overwhelms any possibility of an equitable 
historical study.  
 
The Object Objects  
Maybe one response to this is to think of our relationship to these objects, of our 
fascination with them, as having originated in D.W. Winnicott’s idea of the 
“transitional object”, as socially mediated material objects that have marked a 
particular period of our early lives as we moved from one stage of psychic 
development to another. For Winnicott, as the psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas 
noted, the experience of the transitional phase is often repeated in adult life, “usually 
on the occasion of the aesthetic moment… [where] an individual feels a deep 
	 11
subjective rapport with an object… and experiences an uncanny fusion with it, an 
event that may re-evoke an ego state that prevailed during early psychic life” (Bollas 
1987: 16). Adopting this psychoanalytical methodology, one way of recovering the 
forgotten object is to be sensitive to our own emotional (not intellectual) responses to 
an object we are drawn to. We need to ask ourselves “How we are feeling? Why are 
we feeling? And why now?” when faced with a piece of design and from this start to 
become aware how we have internalized, through an object, a particular psycho-social 
(and historically determined) relationship. Yet, we need to be cautious. In infancy, 
with the transitional object, there is often a sense of omnipotence, a sense of having 
total control over the article in question. In such a relationship, as noted above, lay the 
seeds of the fetishisation of the object that is characteristic of some design writing. 
The latter manifests itself in a form of design criticism that can be playful, yes, but a 
performative encounter with the artifact that it not dissimilar from that of a child’s 
imagined mastery of a much-loved toy. Rather, the first step is to explore the object as 
a symptom of the historian’s own intersubjective development. Here, we move from 
the traditional idea of the historian “working-on” the design-object to the idea of the 
design-object being the active agent over and against the subject’s passivity: the 
object is that which, as Slavoj Žižek has noted, “disturbs the smooth running of 
things” (Žižek 2006: 17).  
 While the exploration of the role of desire in historical discourse challenges 
the establishment of the historian occupying the position of the One, there is a 
problem here. To return to Žižek’s idea of the parallax gap, from what position are we 
engaging in this self-reflective process? From where are we speaking? If the symbolic 
attachments that form our relationship to the object are found in the blind spots, the 
shadows, the gaps, where is the Archimedean Point from which the design historian 
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can view their own involvement in this rendezvous with the object? As already 
indicated, there is not one. Redolent of the Heisenberg Principle, the self functions 
like the positive end of a magnet that distorts the critical space that encircles a design-
object. However, there are hazards in such an approach. If we are unable to develop a 
study of an object via a language that reaches beyond that which is uniquely singular 
to the historian – a language that is itself formed by the unspoken desires of the other 
– all we are left with is an approach that, in its acute solipsism, has no audience 
beyond the self. Nonetheless, such a critique equally serves to negate the actuality, as 
outlined already, that our symbolic investments are themselves formed in networks of 
power. Our attachments are not innocent; they are formed through the symbolic order 
riven with socio-political proclivities. In my instance, Albertus masked the lack in the 
other, a desire that both fascinated and appalled me, a desire, as already noted, shaped 
by the unique experiences of wide-scale patterns of migration and divorce. In brief, 
our psychic investments in particular design-objects are socially and historically 
experienced, but when the socially agreed meanings around an object come to 
predominate, then the path back to our own singular relationship to an object is 
difficult to trace. 
In such situations, as the cultural theorist Mari Ruti has said, when “the 
symbolic gains too much power at the expense of the real, our existence loses its 
passion and forward-moving cadence”. But, correspondingly, as Ruti continues, 
“when the symbolic fails to adequately mediate the disorderly energies of the Real – 
when the quilting points that connect us to social sites of meaning are too fragile – we 
feel terrorized by the over proximity of jouissance [Hudson’s happiness]; we fail to 
gain a steady foothold in cultural narratives and other collective landmarks that would 
be able to anchor us in the symbolic world.” (Ruti 2012: 160).  The design-object can 
	 13
come to mark the site of this struggle, a conflict that is not containable within empty 
universal historical time, but, as Benjamin recognized, that “supplies a unique 
experience with the past” (Benjamin 1992: 255, my italics).2 In Lacanian terms, our 
entry into the symbolic sees a subjecthood that is split. That pre-symbolic unnamable 
part of us is lost forever, and the lifelong search for this lost “Thing” manifests itself 
in creative acts of sublimation, relationships with material objects that are both 
singular and socially codified (Ruti 2012: 127). In terms of design history, such an 
approach becomes productive when we start to grasp why our sublimative desires 
encircle specific objects, why the historical (and politically motivated) languages and 
relationships that played their original role in cutting us from our pre-symbolic selves 
have resurfaced in another historical moment. Although not explicitly 
psychoanalytical, Benjamin captured this when he said “Materialistic 
historiography… involves not only flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where 
thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that 
configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad” (Benjamin 1992: 254, 
my italics). In the first instance, the uncanny encounter, the “configuration pregnant 
with tensions”, is an apposite way of describing the autobiographical “design event” 
outlined at the beginning of this essay. Secondly, and as is well known, Benjamin is 
here advancing a form of historical thought that fractures the abstract and 
homogenous temporality that permeates much historical writing.  
To return to the earlier point, what emerges from this is a vision of the 
historical encounter as a “monad”, a radically consistent but heterogeneous event, that 
sets itself against a form of singular abstraction known as History (but equally so 
other abstractions such as Capital, Nation, etc.). It has been the contention throughout 
this work that a cognizance of certain intersubjective encounters can serve to act as 
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such a monad, a way in which the design-objects we become wedded to mark the 
nexus point of specific social and political discourses. The radical awareness of such 
moments is that a new potentiality can be inserted into the historical record. Clearly, 
this does not mean that we can change past events, as Henri Bergson recognized, “I 
never pretended that one can insert reality into the past and thus work backwards in 
time.” However, as Bergson continues:  
 
one can without any doubt insert there the possible, or, rather, at every 
moment, the possible inserts itself there. Insofar as unpredictable and 
new reality creates itself, its image reflects itself behind itself in 
indefinite past: this new reality finds itself all the time having been 
possible; but it is only at the precise moment of its actual emergence 
that it begins to always have been, and this is why I say that its 
possibility which does not precede its reality, will have preceded it 
once this reality emerges (Bergson, cited in Žižek 2006: 2002). 
 
Benjamin himself was aware of this, when, paraphrasing a comment by the historian 
Andre Monglond, he recognized that “the past has left images of itself in literary 
texts, images comparable to those which are imprinted by light on a photosensitive 
plate. The future alone possesses developers active enough to scan such surfaces 
perfectly” (Benjamin 1999: 482). The work that remains is to ask why some images, 
in this instance, objects of design history, and not others, reveal themselves to the 
historian at a specific moment in time. 
 The logical culmination of this last question is an ethical one. The ground 
from which we view the design-object may be connected across time by the enduring 
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socio-political values from which we first encountered it (or when it was created), but 
the object (and/or ourselves) is not totally determined by these discourses. There is a 
significant degree of freedom in how we view these objects and what we choose to 
accept as causal factors in the construction of meanings around them and our 
relationship to them as historians. Following this, maybe it becomes more useful to 
speak about these elements in terms of their role within competing narratives. As with 
the analysand in the therapeutic setting, who seeks to explore how their identity has 
been shaped within stories that are not fully their own, it is the ability to choose which 
ingredients of the story to emphasize and which to ignore, which offers the real 
freedom. The “truly new emerges through narrative”, Žižek has said, “the apparently 
purely reproductive retelling of what happened – it is this retelling that opens up the 
space (the possibility) of acting in a new way” (Žižek 2014: 150-151). If freedom is 
“inherently retroactive” (Žižek 2014: 204), a decision regarding which past chains of 
necessity or acts will shape the design-object and more significantly, an individual’s 
relationship to it is to move away from a tyranny of the other. We see the objects in 
the past that shaped us, we see why certain historical objects connect with 
contemporary conditions, and through this very act, the significance of those objects 
in history changes. 
 As I hope has been clear throughout this article, to engage in such an approach 
requires a radical break with symbolic identities of the expert, the self-proclaimed 
custodian of design history. It is a case of avoiding what Sartre called “Bad Faith”, in 
this instance, that is adopting the language of a design historian, the tone and style of 
a design historian, becoming maybe not dead, but undead in your relationship to the 
object: a zombie historian that peddles the hegemonic language of “university 
discourse” to such an extent that the singularity of the self is absent. In reference to 
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the work of Eric Santner (see Santner 2001), Mari Ruti recognised that too often 
“disciplinary requirements can…divest us of intellectual capaciousness, open-
mindedness, and generosity to the extent that we find it difficult to appreciate 
anything that falls outside of our own tightly defended way of doing things.” (Ruti 
2012: 31). Maybe, as Alain Badiou speaks of the anti-philosopher, so one could call 
for the figure of the anti-design-historian. As Badiou notes: “Instead of pretending 
that the voice of being or some other objective order directly speaks through him…the 
antiphilosopher speaks only in name of his own tormented subjectivity, as torn 
between salvation and sin, or between saintliness and suicide....” (Badiou 2011: 53). 
Although tinged with a certain strain of nihilistic masculinity, Žižek’s much promoted 
form of subjective destitution is productive here in its call for a need to kill our 
attachments to hegemonic discourses, we must “sacrifice that innermost part of 
yourself, your mode of enjoyment by means of which you were attached to 
power”(Žižek 1999). In this instance, the design historian needs to sever their 
“excessive allegiance to symbolic investitures that seek (sometimes quite brutally) to 
bind [their] energies” (Ruti 2012: 32. It is not about a retreat to the subjective as a 
way of filling the absence of some overarching objective approach to design history 
(Benjamin’s critique of history as a positivist “empty time”). Rather it is about 
refusing to invest ourselves in a form of historical writing that can be enervating, that 
can drain us of our capacity for, to use Winnicott’s phrase, “creative living”. As Ruti 
notes, the withdrawal from the edits of the symbolic order is to reject what is expected 
of us, to reject what it is legitimate to engage with (and how we can engage with an 
object), it is to encourage transcendent experiences that “summon us to what is 
immortal within our being” (Ruti 2012: 29). 
 Nevertheless, the problem always remains, in translating these “transcendent 
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experiences” into the discourse of design history, naming them, are we not in danger 
of collapsing into a rarefied form of language that negates the very radicalism of this 
experience? Maybe, as seen above, a way out of this impasse is to call for a form of 
design history that mirrors at the material level of the text, the tide of meanings that 
twist, swirl and encircle the object. That is, a form of historical writing that is close to 
the way Wittgenstein spoke about poetry and, as Alain Badiou recognized, its ability 
to say materially what can’t be said linguistically, the “unsaid of the saying” or the act 
“summoned at the edges of linguistic evocation” (Badiou 2011: 177–78). Such an 
approach would realize that behind the object is a void, a nameless quality. It is about 
seeking out what the writer Andy Merrifield called a “space of slippage”, a place 
where “we might reinvent ourselves subjectively while creating a new world 
objectively, a new material world, a new physical and social structure. And so in this 
gap, in the nothingness that Sartre tells us exists in our world, that we bring into the 
world, we can begin to locate the realm of freedom, the realm of magic.” (Merrifield 
2011: 141) 
 
 
Image Captions 
Fig. 1. City of London street sign set in Albertus, 11th July, 2014. Photo by author. 
Fig. 2. Plaque mounted above the door of The Prisoner souvenir shop in Portmeirion, 
Wales—“the Village” in the TV series—featuring the Prisoner logotype. Photo: Grace 
Lees-Maffei, 6th May 2007. 
Fig. 3. Image of author as Child, 1978. Author’s collection. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 The event is, as Badiou notes, “something that doesn't enter into the immediate order 
of things” (Badiou 2012: 28) 
 
2 “Historicism gives the ‘eternal’ image of the past; historical materialism supplies a 
unique experience with the past. The historical materialist leaves it to others to be 
drained by the whore called ‘Once upon a time’ in historicism’s bordello. He remains 
in control of his powers, many enough to blast open the continuum of history”. 
(Benjamin 1992: 255) 
 
																																																								
